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1. Introduction. 
 
Wage discrimination between White workers and Black workers in South Africa was 
repugnant, for the outside observer, but seemed easy to explain because of the apartheid 
system. While the latter has been dismantled in the late 1980s, discrimination does not seem 
to have disappeared in this country after the fall of apartheid, although it has probably been 
reduced in many sectors. Hence, some other incentive for discrimination must be at work in 
the South African labor market, to explain the lasting discrimination. Moreover, various 
pieces of empirical work, discussed below, suggest that the remaining discrimination is 
much less pronounced in the unionized sectors than in the non unionized sectors.  
The present paper provides a simple model that captures these two stylized facts of 
the South African labor market: (i) there is probably a deep cause of discrimination in the 
labor market, which has survived the dismantling of apartheid, but (ii) its effects seem to be 
offset to a large extent by unionization. However, the theoretical model presented is 
potentially suitable for of a wider application than the single case of South Africa, as 
apartheid as such plays no part in it. It is based on statistical discrimination theory, which 
assumes some imperfect information of employers about the productivity of each individual 
worker, while Blacks and Whites are supposed to have a different probability distribution 
over their productivity levels, known to the employers. Hence this model could be applied to 
other types of discrimination, e.g. by gender, provided the dividing line between the groups 
is drawn according to some significant differences in the probability distributions over the 
productivity levels of their members. This simple model can be used equally under perfect 
competition on the labor market, or under the assumption of bargaining between a 
representative firm and a trade union. Comparing the competitive equilibrium to the 
outcome resulting from the action of the trade union brings out the impact of trade unions 
on discrimination, showing that the latter changes its nature. Under reasonable assumptions, 
the trade union is thus shown to reduce discrimination1. 
                                                          
1 Myles and Naylor (1995) discuss the impact of unionization on discrimination, when the employer 
has an unexplained taste for the latter, as in Becker (1957). Discrimination is also reduced in that 
model by the union. 
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The next section reviews the history of discrimination and of trade unions in South 
Africa, and discusses some statistical evidence describing the differences between Black and 
White workers, regarding their average wage levels, their involvement in the trade union 
movement, and their education levels. Section 3 presents the model, discussing the effect of 
statistical discrimination in the competitive equilibrium. The impact of unionization on wage 
discrimination is analyzed next, in section 4. Section 5 is devoted to a deeper econometric 
analysis of racial discrimination in the South African labor market in 1999. 
 
2. The Influence of South African Trade Unions on Discrimination. 
 
This section discusses the evolution of the legal setting concerning the South African 
labor market, and presents some descriptive statistics that bring out the extent of the 
remaining racial discrimination, and its plausible causes. 
From Legal to Statistical Discrimination.  
A special feature of discrimination in the South African labor market has for a long 
time been its legal backing by the government. A set of laws and tacit agreements has 
influenced the functioning of this market by establishing a racial wage and job organization2. 
Some important discriminatory steps were undertaken either before or during the apartheid 
regime. In 1924, access to official collective bargaining was refused to Black workers. Then, at 
the end of the 1940’s, a policy of “influx control” was adopted, which limited the 
geographical mobility of Black workers and thus the competition faced by Whites from 
workers accepting lower wages and poorer working conditions. Another measure was the 
introduction, in 1956, of a system of “job reservation”, whereby some occupations were 
legally reserved to a particular racial group. For several decades, this legislation created a 
favorable environment for employers and White workers to discriminate against Blacks, by 
limiting the latter’s access to the same wage rates and jobs as Whites. However, several 
factors gradually revealed to the government the economic and social misdeeds imposed by 
the apartheid policy. The rise in union demands certainly favored this awareness. The labor 
market began to suffer badly from a shortage of skilled labor, as a consequence of both the 
                                                          
2 For further details see Griffiths and Jones (1980). 
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exclusion of Blacks from a performing education system and of the reservation of training 
opportunities to White workers. Moreover, the impediments to geographical and 
professional mobility have hindered the efficient allocation of labor between different 
activities and job categories. It also became difficult for the government to justify the 
continuation of its policy in front of social unrest, especially the Soweto riots in 1976 and the 
mushrooming industrial strikes. The international sanctions against the regime, by limiting 
foreign investment, also contributed to the policy change that M. P. W. Botha implemented 
at the end of the 70’s. Following the recommendations of the Wiehahn and Riekert 
Commissions, the government liberalized gradually its racial policy, allowing in 1979 Black 
unions to participate in collective bargaining, and dismantling in the 1980’s the systems of 
“influx control “ and “job reservation”. Most of the discriminatory laws disappeared at the 
end of the 80’s, in favor of more freedom in labor relations. However, this does not entail 
that discrimination, deeply ingrained in labor relations, has been totally eradicated by the 
progressive legislation. 
Hence, several studies (Allanson et al. (2000), Hinks and Watson (2001), Knight and 
McGrath (1987), Moll (1992, 1995), Rospabé (2002)) aimed at estimating the degree of wage 
discrimination between South African workers of different races. Knight and McGrath as 
well as Moll conclude that wage discrimination has been decreasing over the 1970s and 
1980s. However, Rospabé (2002) shows that wage discrimination between Blacks and Whites 
slightly increased in the second half of the 1990s. Nevertheless, all these studies concur in 
finding that there is still a large percentage of the wage gap remaining to be explained. 
During the 1990’s, the remaining racial wage discrimination cannot reflect anymore, or only 
retrospectively and to a much lower extent, the impact of labor legislation. It must be 
explained by other factors.  
The legacy of apartheid can not be neglected. It seems too that discrimination “prior 
to the labor market”, in the acquisition of human capital, influences wage inequality to a 
large extent. Table 1 shows that White workers have on average 1.5 times as many years of 
education as Black ones, and a lower dispersion in their educational record. Regarding years 
of education as a proxy for the workers’ skills when they arrive on the labor market, these 
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data suggest that, at the time of hiring, the average White workers’ productivity is higher 
than Black workers’ productivity, and that the variance of productivity is larger for Blacks 
than for Whites3.  
 
Table 1 : Years of Education for Male Workers of Each Population Group. 
Years of education Black Workers White Workers 
Mean 7.5 12.2 
Standard deviation 4.2 1.7 
Source : October Household Survey 1999 (Statistics South Africa). 
This suggests that the origin of wage discrimination in the South African case 
requires another kind of discrimination theory. We focus here on statistical discrimination 
theory, which is able to explain unequal wages paid to equally productive workers when the 
employer faces a situation of imperfect information on the workers’ characteristics, and is 
then confronted with a productivity risk4.  
Such models differ from Becker’s work (1957), which assumes an exogenous taste for 
discrimination. Two major theoretical considerations are leaning against this standard model 
of discriminatory tastes. First, this theory cannot explain the persistence of a long-run wage 
gap, as discriminating firms would be driven out of business by competition. Second, it does 
not seem to fit with even a casual observation of the South African labor market. The main 
cause of racial wage discrimination was never linked to the employers’ physical or social  
aversion against Black workers, but rather to a White workers’ fear to lose their status by 
sharing their jobs with the latter (Knight and McGrath, 1977). These White workers used to 
put some pressure on employers, pushing the Black workers’ wages above their marginal 
productivity. However, this is no more relevant after the end of apartheid. In the model 
presented below, it is the employer’s uncertainty about workers’ quality which perpetuates 
wage discrimination, at least in the non unionized sector. 
The two best known models of statistical discrimination are those of Arrow (1973) 
and Phelps (1972). A standard version of the latter is presented by Aigner and Cain (1977). 
                                                          
3 These results are important for the relevance of our model’s assumptions to the South African case. 
4 Frijters (1999) analyzes hiring practices in a South African clothing firm. He shows that the observed 
screening of African workers for hiring could be explained by statistical discrimination. 
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The two models differ by the assumptions made on the productivity signal sent by the 
worker. In Arrow’s model (Arrow, 1973), employers make a hiring test that unveils the 
worker’s true productivity. The wage gap comes from the employers’ subjective opinion 
about the probability that a worker randomly selected in the two racial groups be skilled. In 
the models developed by Phelps (1972) and Aigner and Cain (1977), the test (or signal) is an 
imperfect indicator of the individual productivity. Although the population distribution is 
known, the actual productivity of any worker is unobservable. Firms only observe an 
unbiased noisy signal of productivity. Wage discrimination originates from the Black 
worker’s signal being less informative than the White worker’s one. However, these models 
do not explain different average wages for distinct racial groups. Discrimination is 
individual and intra-group in these models, and does not explain the residuals observed in 
econometric studies. Various models generating such a between-group wage difference have 
been produced. In Lundberg and Startz (1983), wage discrimination depends on the signal 
noise and on the fact that workers can make either unobservable or observable productivity-
enhancing investment in human capital prior to entering the labor market. Oettinger (1996) 
develops a dynamic statistical discrimination model in which productivity is learned after 
one period on a job, and predicts that a Black-White wage gap emerges only as labor market 
experience accumulates. In order to explain the long-run wage discrimination we present a 
simple theoretical model of statistical discrimination in section 3, which captures in the 
employers’ and unions’ objective functions some specific features of the South African case. 
The Impact  of the Trade Unions. 
Various authors have recently come up with some estimates of the impact of South 
African trade unions on wages, using micro-economic data (Butcher and Rouse (2001), Fallon 
and Lucas (1997), Hofmeyr and Lucas (2001), Moll (1993, 1995), Mwabu and Schultz (1998) 
and Rospabé (2001)). They reveal a significant wage differential between unionized and non 
unionized workers, particularly significant for Blacks, but quite small for White workers. All 
their findings suggest that unions influence significantly the bargaining of Black wages, to a 
larger extent than those concerning White wages. This comes out also from the following 
descriptive statistics. 
  
6
 
 
Table 2 : Unionization According to Population Groups (male workers) 
 Black and White 
workers 
Black workers 
 
White workers 
Number unionized 1 638 779 1 362 036 276 742 
Total number of workers* 3 880 267 3 105 077 775 190 
Unionization rate  42.2% 43.9% 35.7% 
Source : OHS 1999. 
Note: * employees reporting their union status. Unionization rates are thus likely to be 
overestimated.  
 
Table 3: Average Monthly Gross Earnings (in Rand) by Population Groups  
and Union Status (male workers). 
Union Status \Gross Wages 
 
Black Workers White Workers Ratio of Earnings of 
Whites to Blacks 
Union members 3308.5 8286.5 2.5 : 1 
Non members 1933.2 7935.2 4.1 : 1 
Ratio of Earnings of union 
members to non members 
1.71 1.04*  
Source : OHS 1999. 
Note: * not statistically significantly different from 1. 
 
Table 2 presents the numbers of unionized workers. With unionization rates as high 
as 35%, or above for both Black and White workers, South Africa is among the most 
unionized developing countries. Furthermore, these figures show that Black workers have a 
higher unionization rate than Whites, since more than 43% of Black employees are 
unionized, whereas only slightly more than a third of the Whites are union members. Table 3 
shows that there are large differences in earnings between workers of different race and 
union status. On average, Black union members earn more than non members (about 70% 
more), whereas there is no significant difference in wages between White unionized and non 
unionized workers. Thus, the racial wage gap is larger in the non-union sector than in the 
union sector. 
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Figure 1. Black Male Workers’ Earnings Distribution (OHS 99) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure2. White Male Workers’ Earnings Distribution (OHS 99) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 shows that unionization entails two main differences in the Black workers’ 
earnings distribution. First, the latter is shifted to the right, towards higher wages for 
unionized workers. Second, the wider dispersion of the distribution among non unionized 
workers shows a stronger wage inequality in the non unionized sector. For Whites, the 
shapes of the earnings distributions are more similar for the two types of workers, with a 
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slight tendency towards wider inequality among non unionized workers, as shown by figure 
25. The econometric estimations presented in section 5 go beyond this descriptive analysis of 
the impact of unionization on racial wage discrimination remaining in South Africa in 1999, 
by controlling for many other determinants of the wage rates. 
This visible importance of trade unions cannot be understood without a prior 
description of the gradual inclusion of Black workers in the trade union movement. Since 
1924, the official system of collective bargaining has mainly relied on the Industrial 
Councils6, comprising one or several trade unions and employers, registered under the law. 
Until 1979, every union representing “pass bearing” employees was excluded from 
registration and hence from the statutory system. During several decades, White workers 
have supported as voters the discriminatory labor legislation. Because only White unions 
were allowed to bargain, they were in a strong position and thus reinforced discrimination 
against Black workers. However, in 1930, an amendment to the Industrial Conciliation Act 
stipulated that each Industrial Council agreement could be extended, after a Labor Minister 
decision, to all workers in the industry, belonging or not to a trade union involved in the 
bargaining. In 1925 was voted the Wage Act, which allowed for minimum wage rates (called 
“wage determination”) in industries or occupations not covered by statutory bargaining 
structures. Although Black trade unions’ activity was discouraged, several unions were 
created under different forms: parallel unions (working with liberal registered unions), 
independent unions, non racial unions and exclusively Black unions, linked to the Africanist 
or the Black Consciousness movements. These unions tried to make up for the lack of 
representation by getting recognition at the plant level. The first recognition agreement of a 
Black union was signed in 1974. However, they did not really contribute to shifting the 
discriminatory trend until the 1980’s. 
In 1979, following the Wiehahn Commission’s recommendations, participation in 
statutory collective bargaining was opened to all trade unions. This radical change was 
                                                          
5 One of the methods often used by unions for reducing wage inequality is to impose a system of “rate 
for the job” for determining wages, which is perceived as a constraint on employers’ arbitrariness. 
However, in the days of apartheid, this principle was used by White workers’ unions for excluding 
Blacks from some jobs (Crankshaw, 1997). 
6 Renamed Bargaining Councils in the new Labor Relations Act of 1995. 
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aimed at controlling better Black unions and preventing proliferation of plant level 
recognition agreements. Nevertheless, it did not stop the development of a two tier 
bargaining system. The 1980s witnessed an increase in Black membership and in the 
bargaining power of the emerging Black and multiracial trade unions, while White unions 
lost a lot of their influence. Progressive unions began to play a role in the reduction of the 
racial wage gap. There is quite a lot of diversity in the South African bargaining system 
across industries and across firms. Wage bargaining takes place at two levels in South Africa. 
At the centralized level, wages are set in Bargaining Councils agreements, which cover 
specific industry, occupation and area (either the whole country, or a province or city)7. As 
seen above, these agreements can be extended to non-parties (though exemptions are not 
uncommon, as shown by Standing et al., 1996). According to Butcher and Rouse (2001), in 
1995, approximately 16% of the employed workers were covered by this kind of agreement. 
Among the covered workers, respectively 42% (33%) of the Blacks (Whites) were unionized. 
At the plant-level, bargaining occurs both in the firms covered and not covered by 
Bargaining Council agreements. In the first case, the bargaining raises the wages paid to 
some workers above those set in the agreements. Together with various exemptions, this 
additional bargaining explains how a union wage premium can occur within firms covered 
by Bargaining Councils agreements. When no Bargaining Council exists (for 84% of the 
employees), plant-level bargained wages mainly affect unionized workers as unionization is 
highly concentrated in some firms, the others not being covered by any wage bargaining. 
About 37% (21%) of the Black (White) not covered workers are union members. Therefore, 
the pattern of collective bargaining in South Africa is drawing a distinction between a 
unionized sector and a non-unionized sector, as a first approximation, although some 
unionized workers are found in the latter.  
The model below uses this stylized fact8, and seeks to explain the origin of the racial 
wage gap in a competitive environment and its change under union bargaining.  
 
                                                          
7 Note that the mining sector has no Bargaining Council but a so-called Agreed Bargaining Forum. 
8 Furthermore, a look at the OHS 1999 data shows that union employment is mainly concentrated in 
three industrial sectors, namely mining, manufacturing and service. 
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3. The Model: Statistical Discrimination in the Competitive Case. 
 
We analyze here the wage discrimination that may occur within a representative 
firm. Workers are divided into two racial groups, each being comprised of Nj workers (j = W 
for Whites and B for Blacks). The distribution of productivity is known for each group but 
the actual productivity of any given worker is unobservable. 
Random Productivity 
Output is a random variable and the production function is specified as follows: 
 
∑∑
==
+= B
W N
i
iB
N
i
iWY
11
θθ ,         (1) 
where the productivity of each worker i of race j is a noisy function of the average 
productivity of that group. It is determined as follows: 
 
BWijjij NNNN +=+= where)( ,εθθ       (2) 
 
We assume that each worker’s productivity is decreasing with the total number of 
workers employed in the firm, be they Black or White, hence 0)(' <Njθ . This captures in a 
simple fashion the kind of congestion effect which is usually assumed with standard 
production functions, as a rationale for decreasing marginal returns to labor, given the 
capital stock. We further assume that 0)('' <Njθ . 
We assume that the distribution of ijε  is such that: 
 
2)(  and  0)( jijij VarE σεε ==  
 
Thus, the expectation and variance of productivity, conditional on N, are given by: 
 
2)(  and  )()( jijjij VarNE σθθθ ==  
 
In order to capture the wider dispersion of education levels between Blacks and 
Whites, seen at table 1, we can assume that the variance of the productivity of Blacks is 
higher than the variance of the productivity of Whites ( 22 WB σσ > ). This assumption is not 
strictly needed for the results presented below, but it adds realism to the model. Indeed, the 
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environment of human capital accumulation appears to have been more heterogeneous for 
Black than for White workers9.  
We also assume that Black workers have a lower average productivity than White 
ones. Thus, we take discrimination “prior to the market” into account. The lower average 
human capital stock accumulated by Black people may originate from a poorer quality and 
quantity of schooling than the one received by Whites10. Then, )()( NN WB θθ < . 
 Given these assumptions, expected output is given by: 
 
)()()( NNNNYE BBWW θθ +=        (3) 
 
This production function displays positive and diminishing marginal returns to each 
type of labor, under the following assumption. Denote ( )'jE N  the expected marginal 
productivity for each group of workers, given by : 
 
∑
=
+=
BWj
jjj
j
NNN
N
YE
,
)(')(
)( θθ∂
∂
,       (4) 
 
which is positive by assumption. In this model, the expected marginal productivity of a 
worker is made of two parts: the expectation of her own productivity, as defined in (2), 
minus the fall in the sum of the expected productivity of all the other workers in the firm, 
which may be called the congestion effect. The marginal productivity of a worker is thus 
positive as long as the former dominates the latter. 
Given the assumptions made about )(''  and  )(' NN jj θθ , this expected marginal 
productivity is decreasing with Nj because: 
 
0)('')('2
²
)(²
,
<+= ∑
= BWj
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j
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N
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∂
 
                                                          
9 This assumption is in agreement with the figures presented in the previous section. Furthermore, the 
earnings equations presented below at tables 2A, 3A, and 4A, in the appendix, confirm that education 
is a major determinant of productivity, as reflected in the earnings in the competitive sector, as well as 
in the unionized sector. Thomas (1996) also shows that dispersion of education among Blacks has 
increased over the last half-century. 
10 Empirical results found by Moll (1995, 1998), Case and Deaton (1999) and Thomas (1996) seem to 
support this idea. 
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The Firm’s Risk Aversion and Competitive Wages 
The firm is assumed to be unable to insure all the productivity risk that it faces, and is 
thus affected by risk aversion. This is captured here by assuming that it maximizes a 
differentiable concave utility function FV , of the standard mean-variance type11 . This is a 
simple way of capturing risk-aversion that takes into account both the productivity and the 
risk of employing the workers belonging to each group, with different variances of 
productivity. 
For the sake of simplicity, we specify the objective function of the firm as: 
 
{ } ( )2 2, ( )W B F w W B BN NMax V E N Nα σ σ= Π − +       (5) 
where:  
 
( ) ( ) W W B BE E Y w N w NΠ = − −         (6) 
 
In this expression, andW Bw w  are the competitive wage rates for each type of 
workers. The linear specification of the impact of the productivity variance of each type of 
workers in (5) allows to write the marginal cost of employing each worker as: 
{ }2 , ,j jw j W Bασ+ ∈ . Thus, α  represents the correction factor that the firm is using for 
pricing the cost of productivity risk. Given this risk-adjusted profit function of the 
representative firm, we can prove the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 112: In the competitive case, statistical discrimination results in the following 
wage differential between White and Black workers: 
 
2 2( ( ) ( )) ( )W B W B W Bw w N Nθ θ α σ σ− = − − − .      (7) 
 
As we have assumed )()( NN WB θθ < and 22 WB σσ > , we can conclude that the wage 
paid to White workers is higher than the Black workers’ one. Equation (7) shows the two 
potential sources of statistical discrimination, namely the difference in the average 
                                                          
11 Ruling out full insurance against productivity risk as we do here may be justified by the standard 
moral hazard argument. 
12 All the proofs are rejected in the appendix. 
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productivity of the workers in each group, and the difference in the variance of their 
productivity. Notice that this model can encompass cases where one group of workers is not 
dominated on both accounts. We might have a positive wage differential even if the relative 
ranking of the two groups according to the two criteria was of opposite sign: for example, 
the high-mean group might have a higher variance too, and still earn more, if the former 
effect dominates the latter. Moreover, if the risk aversion of the employers is high enough, 
with a large α, then the difference in variance is all that matters.  
Equation (7) sheds an interesting light on the political economy of apartheid. The pass 
system and the job reservation policies were aiming mainly at affecting the Black workers’ 
competitive wage. Then, the White nationalist unions were all powerful, and had been able 
to impose these measures (see Wintrobe, 1998). The relationship between the level of 
employment and the competitive wage gap can be derived by using (7). Then, an increase in 
the alternative-wage gap is consistent with a restrictive hiring policy, as was observed in 
those days, if 0)(')(' <− NN BW θθ , i.e. if the congestion effect, at the margin, is stronger for 
White workers than for Black workers.  
Thus, this simple model of statistical discrimination, accounting for the presence of 
discrimination prior to the market, can capture the kind of wage discrimination and the 
between-group wage differential that is observed empirically. The next section extends this 
framework to analyze the impact of trade unions. 
 
4. The Role of Trade Unions: Efficient Bargaining v. Statistical Discrimination. 
 
Not all workers of each race are union members13. Thus we want a simple model 
where membership is endogenous. In this respect, the assumption made below is close to 
that presented in Booth (1984). Since the end of Apartheid in South Africa, the trade unions 
                                                          
13 The Labour Relation Act (1995) stipulates that a representative trade union and an employer 
organization may conclude a closed shop agreement, requiring all employees covered by the 
agreement to be members of the trade union, following some specific conditions. Although there are 
no official figures on the extent of the closed-shop, it seems to concern only a minority of workers. 
However, the legislation also deals with the free rider issue by permitting agency shop agreements 
that require the employer to deduct an agreed agency fee from the wages of its employees who are 
identified in the agreement and who are not members of the trade union. 
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have played a definite political part, in pushing for clearing the labor market of the residual 
discrimination that can still be observed there, as suggested in the previous section. Then an 
important question to ask is why both types of workers get involved in the unions.  
The Trade Union Objective Function 
The literature on the open shop trade union has emphasized the non-pecuniary 
private benefits that union membership provides to their members, beside the expected 
monetary rewards (Booth, 1985, Booth and Chatterji, 1993, Naylor, 1989, Naylor and Cripps, 
1993). They emphasize reputation effects, for compliance with social norms. In the South 
African case, it is probably even more important, as far as White workers are concerned, to 
emphasize the enhanced self-esteem due to a sense of commitment to a progressive cause. 
Moreover, they might also join the union with a hope of getting some job protection, in front 
of the extension of the affirmative action policy officially adopted recently. In order to take 
this type of effects on board, we assume that a worker of group j gets a non-pecuniary 
reward worth { }BWjrj ,, ∈ , beside the expected monetary one, when joining the union14. In 
addition, a group j worker incurs a membership cost worth { }BWjj ,, ∈γ . This may capture 
both the monetary contributions that may be required from union members and the value of 
the time that they have to invest in union activity. 
The trade union is assumed as usual in this literature to aggregate somehow the 
preferences of its members. In this respect, we follow the standard approach of specifying a 
utilitarian objective function for the union. For { },j W B∈ , denote jL  the number of union 
workers, jN  employment in the unionized sector, jw  the alternative sector wage or the 
unemployment benefit and, ( )jv w  the increasing and concave utility function of the 
representative member. However, we extend this formulation by allowing for the possibility 
that the union may also discriminate between the two groups of workers. Taking into 
account the non-pecuniary benefits as well as the cost of membership defined above, union 
preferences are given by: 
 
                                                          
14 For the sake of simplicity, this non-pecuniary reward is assumed exogenous. An interesting 
extension would be to assume that it depends on the level of union membership, as in Booth (1985) 
and Naylor (1989).  
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( )( ){ }, ( ) ( ) ( )U j j j j j j j j jj W BV N v w L N v w r Lβ γ∈= + − + −∑ .    (8) 
 
If B>0  and  0Wβ β = , the union only values the White workers’ interests and then 
discriminates against Black workers15. This situation can be representative of the behavior of 
a few South African nationalist unions during the apartheid regime, e.g. the South African 
Confederation of Labor. However, since the Labor Relation Act of 1995, such a race-based 
behavior is prohibited. If B0  and  0Wβ β= > , the union only takes into account the rent 
accruing to the Black workers. Some South African unions, Africanist or Black Consciousness 
oriented, seem to support this kind of policy. Finally, when B0  and  0Wβ β> > , the union 
weighs the rents accruing to each of the two groups of workers. It is probably the case of the 
multi-racial unions which nowadays dominate the union scene. 
The Structure of the Game 
Assume that the game takes place in two stages. At stage one, all the workers 
correctly forecast the wage and employment level that the union is going to give to its 
members from each group, because the parameters of the model are common knowledge. 
Workers freely join the union as long as the expected utility derived from doing so, taking 
due account of the non-pecuniary benefits and costs of membership, is larger than the 
expected utility of working in the non-unionized, or competitive, sector. Union membership 
is thus modeled as resulting from free entry of the workers into the unionized sector of the 
economy. We assume that the economy is clearly divided into two sectors, with the labor 
force employed in the unionized sector being small enough to leave the wage rate in the 
competitive sector unaffected. The latter is determined as described in the previous section, 
for a fixed supply of labor. Then, bargaining takes place given the membership level.  
There are mainly two approaches to modeling the bargaining behavior of trade 
unions: it is either assumed that bargaining concerns only the wage rate, the firm choosing 
unilaterally the employment level –  it is the ‘right-to-manage’ model (Nickell, 1982, Booth 
and Chatterji, 1995) –  or that the union and the firm simultaneously determine wages and 
                                                          
15 One could specify 1B Wβ β= − , as is often done in this type of objective function. However, there is 
no point in so restricting the sum W Bβ β+  as what matters is only the ratio W Bβ β  (see e.g. (12) 
below). 
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employment –  it is the efficient bargaining model (McDonald and Solow, 1981). The choice 
of the efficient bargaining model is often justified by its efficiency properties. Indeed, the 
wage and employment outcome of the right-to-manage model lies on the labor demand 
curve, and hence is Pareto inefficient. This can be viewed as resulting from the inability of 
the firm to commit credibly to the agreed upon employment level. When bargaining 
concerns both wages and employment, the outcome is located on a contract curve, defined as 
all possible points of tangency between the iso-profit and union indifference curves, and is 
then Pareto efficient. In other respects, although there is some evidence to suggest that 
unions and firms emphasize bargaining over wages only, it seems that the available 
empirical research is unable to discriminate between the two models (Booth, 1995). 
Thus, in the second stage of the game, the union bargains over wage and 
employment levels with the representative firm. As seen previously, this is meant to capture 
the working of the bargaining councils, which exist in some industries in South Africa as 
well as the plant-level bargaining. The equilibrium employment level resulting from this 
bargaining process will not necessarily entail full employment of the union members in the 
unionized sector. If a union member does not actually get a job in the latter, we assume as 
usual in this literature that she either finds a job in the competitive sector, or gets an 
unemployment benefit yielding the same utility level as the latter. These unionized workers 
ending up employed in the competitive sector are the losers of the union-membership 
lottery: their ex post utility is lower than that of those who have chosen the competitive 
sector directly. This is simply a reflection of the fact that the expected utility of joining the 
union or not are equal in equilibrium. Hence, the benefits accruing ex post to the lucky ones 
are offset by the losses incurred by the losers, in expected value (see proposition 4 below).  
Now, this game must be solved by backward induction, starting by an analysis of the 
bargaining stage. 
The Bargaining Stage 
First, we must define a status quo or fall-back point for each party if no bargain is 
reached. For the firm, the status quo position is zero: 0=FV . For the union, the status quo 
position is: ( ){ }, ( )U j j j j jj W BV L v w rβ γ∈= + −∑ , i.e. the value of the utilitarian objective 
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function defined above, when all the union members end up working in the competitive 
sector or on the dole. 
So, the net gain of the firm is given by: 
 
( ){ } 2, ( )F F j j j jj W BV V N w Nθ ασ∈− = − −∑ .      (9) 
 
The net gain of the union is: 
 
( ){ }, ( ) ( )U U j j j jj W BV V N v w v wβ∈− = −∑ .      (10) 
 
The solution concept that we use here is the generalized Nash bargaining solution. 
Wages and employment are determined by the maximization of the product of each agent’s 
gain from reaching a bargain, weighted by their respective bargaining powers. More 
precisely, it is derived from : 
 
{ } ( ) ( ) λλ −−−=Ψ 1,,  , FFUUNNWW VVVVMax BWBW      (11) 
 
where λ  measures the bargaining power of the union, with 10 << λ . Then, one can prove 
the following. 
 
Proposition 2: The outcome of the bargaining between the trade union and the 
representative firm results in the wage gap between the two groups given by: 
 
W B
W B
W
w w β βηβ
−− = .         (12) 
where: 
"( )               
'( )
B
B
v w
v w
η = −         (13) 
is the percentage slope of the worker’s marginal utility, measured positively, or its Arrow-
Pratt degree of absolute risk aversion. 
So, the wage gap between the White workers’ wage rate and the Black workers’ one 
depends on the two discriminatory parameters introduced in the union utility function, and 
is independent of the level of the wage rate if the worker’s utility function is of the CARA 
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type16. Hence, statistical discrimination is destroyed in the bargaining process, as the union 
offers a kind of income-redistribution arrangement to its members, relative to the 
competitive wage rates. Therefore, this model can be used to explain why unionization 
seems to reduce discrimination in the case of South Africa, provided we assume that W Bβ β  
is close enough to one. Then, the roots of any remaining discrimination must be sought in the 
political economy of trade unionism17. 
The income-redistribution effect of unionization in this model, consistent with 
endogenous membership as explained below, requires some additional comments. It is 
rooted in the ability of the union to raise the average wage, and to redistribute the bonus 
differentially across the two groups. This is clearly brought out by going one step further in 
the analysis of the determination of the wage rates. As (12) determines the relative wage of 
the two types of workers, we just need to look at the average wage, in order to nail down 
their levels. We need first to establish the following lemma.  
 
Lemma 1: The risk-adjusted rent per worker, defined as the gap between the risk-adjusted 
expected productivity of each type of labor above its market wage, is equalized across racial 
groups. Its expression is for { },j W B∈ :  
 
2( )j j jN wπ θ ασ= − − .18        (14) 
 
Define WN Nν =  as the share of White employment in total employment by the firm. 
We are now in a position to conclude this analysis of the impact of unionization on wages by 
establishing the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3: The average wage bonus due to unionization is determined by the following 
rent-sharing equation: 
 
                                                          
16 This is at variance with the results in Myles and Naylor (1995), which are not based on statistical 
discrimination, where the remaining wage gap depends on the union’s bargaining power. 
17 See Wintrobe (1998) for a survey on the political economy of trade unions under apartheid. 
18 Notice that a meaningful solution to (14) with 0≥π and 0≥N does not necessarily exist for all 
values of the exogenous variables and parameters of the model. If it does not for a particular firm, the 
latter will only hire one type of workers. However, this cannot be true for the representative firm in 
equilibrium, as the alternative wage would adjust, and we assume here that an interior solution exists.  
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(1 ) (1 ) .W B W Bw w w wν ν ν ν λ π+ − = + − +       (15) 
 
Notice that this expression (15) is analogous to a standard rent-sharing equation (see 
e.g. Blanchflower et al., 1996, or Van Reenen, 1996). Hence, the average wage rate in the 
unionized sector is equal to the average alternative wage plus a rent-sharing term, which is 
the product of the bargaining power index of the union times the risk-adjusted-rent per 
worker, measured by valuing labor at its alternative cost.  
Determination of Membership 
We now turn our attention to the first stage of this game. As explained above, we 
assume free entry for workers in the unionized sector, as in Booth (1984). The only constraint 
that they face at this point is that they must join the union for having a chance to get a job in 
this sector. They will do so as long as the expected utility from working in a unionized firm 
is larger than that of working in a competitive one. All the parameters of the model are 
assumed to be common knowledge, so that the workers are able to form a correct expectation 
about the wage rates and the employment levels that will come out of the bargaining stage. 
Then, the determination of membership works as follows. 
Define: 
 
( ) { }( ) ( ) , ,j j j jv w v w N j W Bφ = − ∈ ,       (16) 
 
as the aggregate pecuniary benefit from joining the union, which is determined above.  
Then, the expected utility that the worker gets from joining the union is: 
 
( )jj j j j
j
E v w r
L
φ γ= + + − .        (17) 
We can then easily prove the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4: Under free entry of workers in the unionized sector, (i) equilibrium 
membership of each group is determined by: 
 ( ) '( )
* j j j jj
j j
w w v w N
L
rγ
−= − .        (18) 
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(ii) It is stable provided jj r>γ . 
 
Hence, the level of membership for each group is an increasing function of the wage 
gap between the unionized and the competitive sectors, of the employment level in the 
unionized sector, and of the private non-pecuniary benefit enjoyed by the union members. It 
is obviously decreasing in the cost of union membership. Equation (18) also shows that the 
wage gap between the union and competitive sectors may be negligible in equilibrium for 
race j if jj rto close isγ . As suggested by figure 2, and confirmed in the econometric analysis 
of section 5, this is especially relevant for the white workers in our sample. 
 
5. Empirical Analysis. 
 
It is straightforward to derive the specification of the empirical model from the 
theoretical framework presented above. Define the redistribution term R as: 
 
( ) W LW B
W
R w w β βη β
−= − − .        (19) 
This is the difference between the competitive wage gap and the bargained wage gap 
in favor of white workers (see (12)). Hence, R is larger, the more equalizing is the impact of 
the union on wages. Then, using (7), (12) and (15), one can express the bargained wages as:  
 
B Bw w Rλ π ν= + +          (20) 
(1 )W Ww w Rλ π ν= + − −         (21) 
Equations (20) and (21) express the benefit of unionization over the competitive wage 
and reflect the redistribution effect detailed previously: the bargained wage for group j is 
equal to its alternative wage plus the rent-sharing term plus the redistribution term R, which 
is weighted by the share of the other population group employment in total employment. 
The proposition that we want to test is the following: 
 
Proposition 5: The racial wage gap is higher in the competitive sector than in the unionized 
sector:  
0R >            (22) 
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This proposition is equivalent to saying that the difference between the White and 
Black union wage premiums is negative.  
Specification. 
In the following, we present some estimates of the sign of this expression using some 
results of the union wage effect for each racial group computed from a South African data 
set. We consider here two econometric models. In accordance with the theoretical model, we 
assume that the union status is endogenously determined. If one believes that union status 
has merely an intercept effect on wages then the appropriate model to use is a “treatment 
effects” model. If one thinks that the unionization also has a slope effect, then the switching 
model is called for. The intuition for the latter is that some of the workers’ characteristics 
(e.g. education) might affect earnings differently in the unionized and in the competitive 
sectors. We present the results obtained using both specifications below. 
The treatment effect model is as follows: Earnings of individual i of race j ( ijW  is here 
the natural logarithm of the wage) depends on a set of independent variables ijX  and on a 
dummy that accounts for the worker’s union status ijU 19:  
 
ijijjijjij UXW εδβ ++=         (23) 
 
ijU  is believed to be endogenous and is modeled as the outcome of an unobserved 
latent variable *ijU . It is assumed that 
*
ijU  is a linear function of the exogenous covariates 
ijZ and a random component iju . Specifically, 
 
ijijjij uZU += γ*          (24) 
 
and the observed decision is 
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ >=
otherwise 0
0 if  1 *ij
ij
U
U          (25) 
 
                                                          
19 Another approach for capturing the impact of unionization on wages is to include a measure of 
union density, as done by Booth and Chatterji (1995). However, this piece of information is not 
available in our household survey. A matched worker/firm survey would be needed for that. 
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where, ( )ijiju ε ,  ~ bivariate normal [ ]jj ρσ ε  , ,1  ,0 ,0  
If unobservable variables influencing the earnings are correlated with the ones 
affecting union membership, then one is faced with a self-selection problem: δ doesn’t reflect 
the real value of unionization. Correcting for this self-selection, the wage equation will be as 
follows: 
ij
ijj
ijj
jijjijjij Z
Z
UXW
j
εγ
γφσρδβ ε +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
Φ++= )(
)(
      (26) 
where, (.)φ  and (.)Φ  are respectively the standard normal density and cumulative 
distribution functions. The parameters of this treatment effects model are estimated using a 
two-step method (Maddala, 1983).  
In this case, the union wage effect for each group of workers is computed as :  
 
1)ˆexp(ˆ 1 −= jj δμ . 
 
The limitation of this specification is that it imposes that the jβ  are the same for 
unionized and non unionized workers. However, the theoretical framework discussed above 
suggests that the impact of unionization may interact with some of the independent 
variables (e.g. sector of employment). The following specification, based on the switching 
model, allows for such effects. 
Consider two separate earnings regimes for union and non-union members, 
respectively. Earnings of individual i of race j depend on the worker’s union status and are 
determined according to: 
 
                   +    u uij j ij
u
ijW = Xβ η  if i is in the union sector    (27) 
and 
 
                   +    nn nij j ij ijW = Xβ η  if i is in the non union sector    (28) 
As mentioned above, these wage equations are conditional on the union status choice 
and their estimation by ordinary least squares would produce inconsistent estimates of β 
since workers are not randomly assigned to the union and nonunion sectors. Applying the 
Heckman’s two step estimation procedure, we finally estimate the following wage equations: 
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j
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Z
XW ηγ
γφββ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
Φ−−+= ))(1(
)(
21       (29) 
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Z
XW ηγ
γφββ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
Φ−−+= ))(1(
)(
21       (30) 
The union earnings premium is: [ ] 1)(expˆ 2 −−= Xnjnjj ββμ , where the vector X  
contains the means of the variables computed using the union and non union sample20. 
Depending on the assumptions made on the model (m = 1 for the treatment effect 
model and 2 for the switching model), for testing proposition 5, we are interested in the sign 
of the following differences: mB
m
W μμ ˆˆ − .  
The Data Set and Variables21. 
The data are derived from the 1999 October Household Survey conducted by 
Statistics South Africa22. A two-stage sampling procedure was applied in the OHS, and the 
sample was stratified, clustered and selected to meet the requirements of probability 
sampling. The survey covers 30 000 households of all races. Only employed persons from 
age 15 to 65 are considered here. Females, self-employed as well as workers with non-
positive or unspecified wages or hours of work are omitted from the sample. Observations 
with missing data on any variable included in the earnings and unionization functions were 
disregarded. The domestic sector, which does not provide any jobs for White employees and 
remains almost unaffected by unionization is also excluded from the sample. Then, the 
sample consists of 6610 Black and 1114 White male wage-earning employees. 
The earnings variable is the logarithm of hourly earnings, where earnings are defined 
as the total wage or salary (including overtime and bonus) before tax. When the workers 
only report the income interval in which her income fits, we use the mid-point of this 
                                                          
20 There is no agreement in the literature concerning the choice of the vector of means characteristics. 
It can be the vector computed either on the union sample or the non union sample or the whole 
sample. Furthermore, the differential will be interpreted here as an unconditional differential; i.e. the 
selection terms are set to zero.  
21 The description and means of variables are presented in the appendix, in table 1A. 
22 The first reliable South African survey including data on union status is dated from 1993. Since 
then, Statistics South Africa has produced annual surveys (the October Household Survey from 1995 
to 1999 and the General Household Survey from 2002 to 2004) as well as half-yearly survey (the Labor 
Force Survey from 2000 to 2004).  
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interval (40 % of the sample)23. Moreover, to abstract from the effect of variations in hours 
worked, the earnings data were converted into hourly data using the information given by 
the workers on the number of hours they usually work per week. The explanatory variables 
in the earnings equation include the standard human capital measures (schooling, 
experience, tenure – as a proxy for on-the-job-learning), a dummy for union membership, 
one for the marital status (as a proxy for factors such as stability, motivation and discipline), 
some job characteristics (occupational level24, industrial sectors, formal sector) as well as 
location variables (a urban dummy and province dummies, in order to take into account the 
differences in the cost of living, as well as sectoral effects).  
The union status variable available is whether or not the worker is a paid-up 
member25. Its determinants are all the independent variables introduced in the earnings 
equation plus some exclusive variables which are assumed to have an influence on the union 
membership but not on the earnings26. A dummy Other union members indicates whether 
there are other persons in the household who are also union member. According to Moll 
(1993), this variable reflects household-specific tastes for unionization, such as political 
orientation and the willingness to invest union dues for the sake of long security and wage 
gains. We also include the ratio of young in the household to the number of wage earners 
(dependence ratio). It is assumed that workers with larger needs at home are more likely than 
others to join a union, as a means of enhancing job security. A dummy denoting the presence 
                                                          
23 We alternatively ran interval regressions which allow to process estimates on income interval data. 
In our case, the results are almost identical to the OLS estimates using the mid-points. However, in 
order to take into account the selection effect, we choose the Heckman’s model instead of the 
generalized tobit model.  
24 An attempt was made to consider the occupational categories as endogenous, introducing the 
predicted probabilities of being in a particular occupation instead of the actual occupation. 
Unfortunately, due to the low number of observations for white workers, the multinomial logit results 
are too weak to be trustable.  
25 An additional piece of information would be desirable for capturing the impact of unionization, 
namely the establishment union status. However, this is not available in the household survey used 
here, and would require a matched worker/firm survey. Nevertheless, we know that the probability 
that a firm is unionized or not depends a lot on its sector of activity, and we control for several 
characteristics of the latter in the estimated equations. 
26 Unfortunately, the survey does not contain obvious variables that could be used for identification, 
such as union dues for instance. 
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of unemployed persons in the household (unemployed in the household) is also included for the 
same purpose. 
Results27. 
Table 4  presents the estimates of the union wage premium for both White and Black 
workers derived from the two econometric models specified earlier. In order to test 
proposition 5, the difference in the union effect between the two population groups is 
computed as well. Whichever model is considered, only Black union members earn 
significantly more than non-union members do. There is no evidence of a union wage 
premium for White workers. This result is common in the literature on the union wage 
premium in South Africa28. Within the present framework, it must be interpreted in the light 
of (20) and (21). The positive union premium for Black workers does not tell us much about 
proposition 5, as a very strong rent-sharing term πλ  might more than offset a perverse 
redistribution effect R . However, the non significant union premium for White workers 
suggests that the inequality-reducing union effect, highlighted in proposition 5 above, is 
approximately of the same magnitude as the rent-sharing effect, so that they almost exactly 
cancel out. Moreover, the White-Black difference in this union wage effect is negative and 
statistically significant, according to the final row of table 4. This empirical result also implies 
that one cannot discard proposition 5, namely that 0R > , and thus, that the racial wage gap 
is higher in the competitive sector than in the unionized sector.  
 
                                                          
27 The results of the estimates of the earnings equations for the two models are displayed in the 
appendix, tables 2A, 3A and 4A. The determinants of union membership are estimated in table 5A. 
28 As a comparison, using the simple OLS model and considering the union status as exogenously 
determined, we find a union premium of 26.9% for Black workers and 0.5 % (but insignificant) for 
Whites. These figures are more in accordance with Butcher and Rouse (2001) and Mwabu and Schultz 
(2000) results using the same methodology. The substantial difference with the outcome derived here 
for Blacks comes from the correction for sample selection. Indeed, we find that the self-selection 
correction term in the treatment effect model is negative and significant for Blacks (see table 2A). This 
means that unobserved characteristics make Black people with a higher probability of unionization 
more likely to receive lower wages. Not taking into account this sample selection effect thus under-
estimates the real wage effect of unionization. In the case of White workers, the correction for the 
selectivity bias doesn’t appear to be necessary. 
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Table 4: Estimates of the Inequality-Reducing Effect of Unionization  
 
 Union wage effect (in %) 
 Treatment effects model Switching model 
White workers (1) 2.98 
(0.1669) 
6.90 
(0.1738) 
Black workers (2) 100.46* 
(0.2712) 
83.82* 
(0.2766) 
(1) – (2) -97.47* 
(0.3058) 
-76.92* 
(0.3274) 
Source : OHS 1999. 
Notes : standard errors in parentheses are computed using the bootstrap method.  
(*) : statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 
Moreover, tables 3.A and 4.A, in the appendix, provide a little more information on 
the incidence of the union effect across industries and regions. The last two columns show 
that the inequality-reducing effect of unionization is not equally significant in all the rows. 
Hence, as predicted by the theoretical model, there are sectors of employment where 
unionized and non unionized workers are paid the same. Unfortunately, the household 
survey used here does not allow to go any further in distinguishing the different types of 
firms, while this would be desirable for a finer testing of the theoretical framework. A 
matched data set, including data for workers and for the firms that employ them would be 
required for that. Nevertheless, these tables show that some of this relevant heterogeneity is 
captured here, by the various dummy variables indicating the different sectors and regions. 
As expected, this is more noticeable for Black workers. 
 
6. Conclusion. 
 
The main result of this model is that, in a situation of efficient bargaining in which the 
firm would impose statistical discrimination against a group of workers under competitive 
conditions, the intervention of a trade union may remove this kind of discrimination. The 
union raises the average wage, at the cost of a lower employment level in the unionized firm, 
and may redistribute the bonus in favor of the discriminated workers. However, wage 
discrimination may persist, but this time due to the discrimination imbedded in the union’s 
preferences, through the parameters of its utility function. Hence, the roots of the 
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discrimination occurring in the unionized sector should be sought in the political economy of 
trade unionism. After the fall of apartheid in South Africa, it seems plausible that this form of 
discrimination has been dampened considerably. Thus, by removing the effect of statistical 
discrimination, this finding suggests that the union gives rise to a form of private income 
redistribution in favor of the workers belonging to the racial group which would otherwise 
suffer from statistical discrimination. 
This theoretical result seems to be confirmed by the econometric analysis presented in 
section 5. The latter shows that the impact of unionization on wages seems to be higher for 
Black workers than for White workers, who get on average roughly the same wage when 
they are unionized as when they are not. We thus find that the racial wage gap is reduced 
under union bargaining.   
The theory and empirical evidence presented in this paper thus point to the legal 
framework for industrial relations, insofar as it affects the political economy of trade 
unionism, and to the policy towards human capital development, as the two crucial elements 
of a policy aiming at making the South African labor market more equitable. 
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Appendices 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: Expected profit can be written as: 
 
( ){ },( ) j j jj W BE N w Nθ∈ ⎡ ⎤Π = −⎣ ⎦∑        (A.1) 
Thus, (5) amounts to: 
 
{ } { }
2
, ,
( )
W B
F
j j j jN N j W B
Max V N w Nθ ασ∈ ⎡ ⎤= − −⎣ ⎦∑      (A.2) 
The first-order conditions for this maximization problem are for { },j W B∈ : 
 
2' ( ) 0
F
j j j
j
V E N w
N
∂ ασ∂ = − − =         (A.3) 
Then, rearranging the terms yields : 
 
2' ( )j j jw E N ασ= − .         (A.4) 
In words, the wage rate for each group is equal to the expected marginal productivity 
of a worker from that group (see (4)), corrected by the risk factor characteristic of that 
group29. Thus, subtracting (A.4) for Blacks from (A.4) for whites allows to write the wage 
differential as in (7). QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: Let us consider the first order conditions with respect to  and  W Bw w , 
{ },j W B∈ : 
 
( )'( )   1 F F U Uj jv w V -V V Vλ βλ = −− .        (A.7) 
The ratio of (A.7) for the two groups yields: 
 
'( ) 1
'( )
WW
B B
v w
v w
β
β = .         (A.8) 
This expression can be solved for the wage gap. Defining η  as in (13), one can use a 
Taylor expansion of  ( )' Wv w  about Bw  to write (12). QED 
                                                          
29 It can be shown easily that the wage rate for each group is a decreasing function of the level of 
employment of workers from the other group. Hence, this model could provide micro-foundations for 
an analysis of apartheid, somewhat related to the discussion in Wintrobe (1998). Here, white workers 
would benefit from restricting access by Black workers to the firms in which they work, by the so-
called pass system, which was in force under apartheid, at the expense of their employers. Hence, the 
number of Black workers in the representative firm would then depend on the relative bargaining 
power of white workers and their employers. 
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Proof of Lemma 1: We need first to derive the second set of first-order conditions, 
with respect to NW and NB: 
           ( ) ( ) 2( ) ( )  ' ( ) 0.1 F F U Uj j j j j jv w v w V V V V E N wλ β ασλ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − + − − − =⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦−   (A.9) 
From this first-order conditions, using the ratios of (A.9) to (A.7) for the two groups, 
and using a Taylor expansion of v( jw ) about jw , one can derive two equations that 
determine implicitly N and ν : 
 
and 
( )
( )
2
2
( ) '( ) (1 ) '( ) ,
( ) '( ) (1 ) '( ) .
W W B W W
B W B B B
N N N N w
N N N N w
θ νθ ν θ ασ
θ νθ ν θ ασ
+ + − = +
+ + − = +
              (A.10) 
These two equations, similar in some respects to (A.3) and (A.4), show that the level 
of employment of each type of worker is chosen such that the expected marginal 
productivity of each type of worker is equal to her alternative wage cost, corrected by the 
risk factor characteristic of her group. Then (14) is easily derived from (A.10). QED 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: We need to derive an expression for the average wage from (A.9). 
Using (A.7) and (A.8), and defining  ν = NW/N as the share of White employment in total 
employment by the firm, these expressions can be arranged to read: 
 
          
( )
( ) ( )2 2
1
( ) (1 ) '( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) '( )
W B
W W W B B B
w w
N N N N N N
ν ν
ν θ ασ λ θ ν θ ασ λ θ
+ − =
− + − + − − + −      (A.11) 
Therefore, the average wage rate is increasing with the average productivity of the 
two types of workers, decreasing in the average variance of their productivity, and 
increasing in the bargaining power of the trade union. A close examination of (A.11) shows 
that the latter effect results from the ability of the union to offset the negative impact on the 
marginal productivity of each type of worker that the firm can have by increasing 
employment. In other words, the union acquires the means to redistribute wages across 
groups by restricting the total employment level in the firm. Equation (A.11) does not 
determine fully the average wage, as it is not a reduced form, N and ν remaining to be 
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determined. Nevertheless, the effect sketched above holds true also in equilibrium, as shown 
in proposition 3. 
Using (A.10) together with (14), one can derive (15) easily, taking into account the fact 
that: 
( ))(')(' NNNN BBWW θθπ +−= . QED            (A.12) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.1: Entry into the Unionized Sector 
 
Proof of Proposition 4: Notice first that 0 ifj j jw wφ > > . As union membership can 
obviously not be negative, (18) shows that ifj j j jw w rγ> > , in equilibrium. Assuming the 
latter to hold, the dynamics of entry into the unionized sector can be analyzed with the help 
of figure A.1. The downward sloping hyperbola represents (17). The horizontal line drawn at 
the ( )jv w  level represents the utility level reached by the type j worker if she chooses the 
competitive sector. Entry occurs as long as the hyperbola lies above the horizontal line, while 
exit occurs in the opposite case. The arrows drawn on the horizontal axis show that the 
resulting dynamics converges to 
jj
j
j r
L −= γ
φ
* , where ( )j jE v w= . 
Then, (18) is derived by using a Taylor expansion of ( )jv w  about jw , and 
substituting for jφ . QED 
 
 
 
( )jv w  
jE  
*jL  
jL  
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Table 1A. Definition of the Variables and Descriptive Statistics. 
Variable Description Mean and standard 
deviation 
  White 
workers 
Black 
workers 
 Dependent :   
Union member = 1 if is a union paid-up member 0.40 (0.49) 0.47 (0.50) 
Earnings Logarithm of the hourly earnings 3.23 (0.95) 1.77 (1.12) 
     Independent :   
 Union membership and earnings equation   
Years of schooling = number of years of schooling 12.25 (1.70) 7.49 (4.19) 
Years of 
schooling*tertiary 
= number of years of schooling*dummy for 
tertiary education (technical and university 
diploma, above matric) 
5.47 (6.74) 1.14 (3.75) 
Age = age 36.86 (11.21) 37.20 (10.20) 
Age square = age square 1484.4 (876.3) 1487.9 (809.7) 
Tenure  = years of seniority within the present firm 8.35 (8.88) 7.81 (8.27) 
Tenure square = tenure square 148.6 (326.1) 129.4 (275.6) 
Married = 1 if married, civilly or traditionally 0.69 (0.46) 0.54 (0.50) 
Occupational 
categories 
highly skilled: managers, professionals, semi-
professionals and technicians 
skilled: Clerks, salesperson and skilled service 
workers, skilled agricultural workers and 
artisans) 
unskilled (ref): Operators, routine workers 
0.52 (0.50) 
 
0.37 (0.48) 
 
0.11 (0.31) 
0.11 (0.32) 
 
0.41 (0.49) 
 
0.48 (0.50) 
Formal sector = 1 if works in the formal sector (fiscal registration 
of the employer) 
0.98 (0.15) 0.89 (0.32) 
Sectors Agriculture 
Mining 
Manufacturing (ref) 
Utility 
Construction 
Trade 
Transport 
Finance 
Service 
0.05 (0.22) 
0.09 (0.29) 
0.18 (0.39) 
0.01 (0.12) 
0.03 (0.16) 
0.17 (0.38) 
0.10 (0.30) 
0.17 (0.38) 
0.20 (0.40) 
0.18 (0.39) 
0.15 (0.36) 
0.15 (0.35) 
0.01 (0.12) 
0.08 (0.28) 
0.13 (0.33) 
0.06 (0.24) 
0.06 (0.23) 
0.17 (0.38) 
Urban =1 if lives in a urban area 0.90 (0.30) 0.57 (0.49) 
Province Gauteng (ref) 
Western Cape 
Eastern Cape 
Northern Cape 
Free State 
Kwazulu Natal 
North West 
Mpumalanga 
Northern province 
0.35 (0.48) 
0.18 (0.38) 
0.10 (0.29) 
0.06 (0.25) 
0.10 (0.30) 
0.05 (0.22) 
0.04 (0.21) 
0.08 (0.27) 
0.04 (0.21) 
0.20 (0.40) 
0.06 (0.23) 
0.07 (0.26) 
0.03 (0.18) 
0.13 (0.33) 
0.13 (0.34) 
0.14 (0.35) 
0.13 (0.34) 
0.10 (0.30) 
 Union membership equation only   
Other union member  = 1 if other individuals in the household are paid-
up union member. 
0.22 (0.41) 0.13 (0.33) 
Dependence ratio = number of children under 15 / number of wage 
earners 
0.55 (0.79) 0.83 (1.22) 
Unemployed in the 
household 
= 1 if some individuals in the household are 
unemployed 
0.08 (0.27) 0.31 (0.46) 
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Table 2A. Determinants of Earnings (Treatment Effects Model) 
 
       
Dependent variable :  
ln hourly wage 
White workers (1) Black workers (2) (1) – (2) 
       
       
 Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error 
       
Years of schooling 0.0632** 0.0206 0.0376* 0.0035 0.0256 0.0209 
Years of schooling*tertiary 0.0100** 0.0050 0.0330* 0.0038 -0.0230* 0.0062 
Age 0.0716* 0.0158 0.0371* 0.0075 0.0344** 0.0175 
Age square -0.0008* 0.0002 -0.0004* 0.0001 -0.0004*** 0.0002 
Tenure  0.0142** 0.0064 0.0109** 0.0038 0.0033 0.0075 
Tenure square -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 
Married 0.1203*** 0.0616 0.1040* 0.0257 0.0162 0.0668 
Union member 0.0294 0.1481 0.6954* 0.1161 -0.6660* 0.1882 
High skilled occupationa 0.7696* 0.0880 0.4316* 0.0450 0.3380* 0.0989 
Skilled occupation 0.3569* 0.0844 0.0724** 0.0249 0.2845** 0.0880 
Formal sector 0.3804** 0.1519 0.1305** 0.0442 0.2499 0.1582 
Agricultureb -0.5437* 0.1432 -0.7168* 0.0529 0.1731 0.1527 
Mining 0.2134** 0.1033 -0.1769* 0.0542 0.3903* 0.1167 
Utility -0.1483 0.2077 0.1847** 0.0934 -0.3330 0.2278 
Construction -0.1189 0.1551 0.0374 0.0524 -0.1563 0.1637 
Trade -0.3389* 0.0829 -0.1777* 0.0432 -0.1612*** 0.0935 
Transport -0.0889 0.0947 -0.0241 0.0507 -0.0648 0.1074 
Finance -0.0411 0.0788 -0.0783 0.0542 0.0372 0.0957 
Service -0.2180** 0.0821 0.0465 0.0441 -0.2645** 0.0932 
Urban 0.1456 0.0999 0.1249* 0.0273 0.0207 0.1036 
Western Capec 0.1611** 0.0682 0.0954*** 0.0519 0.0657 0.0857 
Eastern Cape -0.1893** 0.0942 -0.4075* 0.0485 0.2182** 0.1059 
Northern Cape -0.1432 0.1098 -0.0692 0.0651 -0.0740 0.1276 
Free State -0.1717** 0.0864 -0.4652* 0.0405 0.2935** 0.0954 
Kwazulu Natal -0.0675 0.1089 -0.0493 0.0396 -0.0182 0.1159 
North West -0.0765 0.1197 -0.1795* 0.0400 0.1030 0.1262 
Mpumalanga -0.0070 0.0956 -0.1341* 0.0402 0.1271 0.1037 
Northern province -0.0978 0.1170 -0.1135** 0.0454 0.0158 0.1254 
Intercept -0.1202 0.4010 0.2458 0.1521 -0.3660 0.4289 
       
Lambda -0.0161 0.0921 -0.2788* 0.0689 0.2628** 0.1151 
       
       
 Chi2 Prob> Chi2 Chi2 Prob> Chi2   
Wald test (intercept only)  839.11 0.00 6848.89 0.00   
       
       
 F Prob> F     
Chow test (constant coeff. 
between (1) and (2)) 
21.22 0.00     
       
N 1114  6613    
       
Source : OHS 1999. 
Notes : * statistically significant at the 1% level, **  the 5% level and ***  the 10% level.  
Reference categories: (a) low-skilled occupation, (b) manufacturing, (c) Gauteng 
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Table 3A. Determinants of Earnings (Switching Model) – White workers 
 
       
Dependent variable :  
ln hourly wage 
Union members (1) Non union members (2) (1) – (2) 
       
       
 Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error 
       
Years of schooling 0.0713** 0.0321 0.0618** 0.0272 0.0095 0.0421 
Years of schooling*tertiary 0.0017 0.0078 0.0140** 0.0065 -0.0123 0.0101 
Age 0.0730** 0.0286 0.0698* 0.0200 0.0032 0.0349 
Age square -0.0008** 0.0004 -0.0008* 0.0003 0.0000 0.0004 
Tenure  0.0153 0.0094 0.0132 0.0115 0.0020 0.0149 
Tenure square -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0004 0.0000 0.0004 
Married 0.0964 0.0938 0.1557*** 0.0821 -0.0593 0.1247 
High skilled occupationa 0.5376* 0.1337 0.8886* 0.1189 -0.3510** 0.1789 
Skilled occupation 0.2097*** 0.1224 0.4618* 0.1164 -0.2521 0.1689 
Formal sector 0.1755 0.3236 0.3860** 0.1725 -0.2106 0.3667 
Agricultureb 0.0515 0.3653 -0.6753* 0.1623 0.7268*** 0.3998 
Mining 0.3775** 0.1476 0.1175 0.1530 0.2600 0.2126 
Utility -0.1848 0.2765 0.0418 0.3212 -0.2266 0.4238 
Construction 0.7593** 0.2844 -0.4346** 0.1846 1.1939* 0.3390 
Trade -0.0451 0.1549 -0.4326* 0.0995 0.3876** 0.1841 
Transport 0.0000 0.1339 -0.0544 0.1383 0.0543 0.1925 
Finance 0.2232 0.1489 -0.1234 0.0927 0.3465** 0.1754 
Service -0.0268 0.1194 -0.2297** 0.1167 0.2028 0.1669 
Urban 0.3569** 0.1669 0.0708 0.1258 0.2860 0.2090 
Western Capec 0.1297 0.1222 0.1857** 0.0824 -0.0560 0.1474 
Eastern Cape -0.1263 0.1233 -0.2621*** 0.1465 0.1358 0.1915 
Northern Cape -0.0326 0.1651 -0.2013 0.1468 0.1687 0.2209 
Free State -0.1945 0.1258 -0.1121 0.1187 -0.0824 0.1729 
Kwazulu Natal -0.1488 0.1805 -0.0220 0.1347 -0.1268 0.2252 
North West 0.1402 0.1862 -0.2896*** 0.1558 0.4298*** 0.2428 
Mpumalanga 0.0480 0.1405 -0.0002 0.1340 0.0482 0.1942 
Northern province -0.0401 0.1895 -0.0942 0.1478 0.0541 0.2403 
Intercept -0.1829 0.7563 -0.0074 0.4886 -0.1754 0.9004 
       
Lambda -0.1362 0.1200 -0.0958 0.1466 -0.0404 0.1895 
       
       
 Chi2 Prob> Chi2 Chi2 Prob> Chi2   
Wald test (intercept only)  380.78 0.00 726.42 0.00   
       
       
 F Prob> F     
Chow test (constant coeff. 
between (1) and (2)) 
1.22 0.4665     
       
N 444  670    
       
Source : OHS 1999. 
Notes : * statistically significant at the 1% level, **  the 5% level and ***  the 10% level.  
Reference categories: (a) low-skilled occupation, (b) manufacturing, (c) Gauteng 
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Table 4A. Determinants of Earnings (Switching Model) – Black workers 
 
       
Dependent variable :  
ln hourly wage 
Union members (1) Non union members (2) (1) – (2) 
       
       
 Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error 
       
Years of schooling 0.0417* 0.0049 0.0327* 0.0050 0.0090 0.0070 
Years of schooling*tertiary 0.0295* 0.0044 0.0426* 0.0064 -0.0131*** 0.0077 
Age 0.0318** 0.0121 0.0368* 0.0100 -0.0050 0.0157 
Age square -0.0003** 0.0001 -0.0004** 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 
Tenure  0.0218* 0.0063 0.0051 0.0054 0.0168** 0.0083 
Tenure square -0.0004** 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0002 
Married 0.1013** 0.0340 0.1030** 0.0373 -0.0018 0.0505 
High skilled occupationa 0.3368* 0.0549 0.5502* 0.0703 -0.2134** 0.0892 
Skilled occupation 0.0914** 0.0325 0.0320 0.0368 0.0594 0.0491 
Formal sector 0.4073* 0.1239 0.0384 0.0549 0.3689** 0.1355 
Agricultureb -0.8225* 0.0922 -0.5935* 0.0727 -0.2291*** 0.1174 
Mining -0.1591** 0.0634 -0.2337** 0.1130 0.0746 0.1296 
Utility 0.1019 0.1093 0.2429 0.1527 -0.1411 0.1878 
Construction -0.2478** 0.0923 0.1555** 0.0683 -0.4033* 0.1148 
Trade -0.1721** 0.0625 -0.1675** 0.0591 -0.0046 0.0860 
Transport 0.1193*** 0.0663 -0.1508** 0.0734 0.2701** 0.0989 
Finance -0.2369** 0.0773 -0.0008 0.0740 -0.2361** 0.1070 
Service 0.0698 0.0530 0.0562 0.0720 0.0136 0.0894 
Urban 0.0914** 0.0342 0.1652* 0.0417 -0.0737 0.0540 
Western Capec 0.0904 0.0750 0.0619 0.0718 0.0285 0.1038 
Eastern Cape -0.2500* 0.0632 -0.5505* 0.0712 0.3005** 0.0952 
Northern Cape 0.1762** 0.0811 -0.3030** 0.1008 0.4792* 0.1294 
Free State -0.2089* 0.0518 -0.7065* 0.0605 0.4977* 0.0796 
Kwazulu Natal -0.0136 0.0554 -0.1112** 0.0556 0.0976 0.0785 
North West -0.0303 0.0501 -0.3063* 0.0612 0.2759* 0.0791 
Mpumalanga 0.0485 0.0524 -0.3018* 0.0592 0.3503* 0.0791 
Northern province 0.1029*** 0.0573 -0.3194* 0.0687 0.4223* 0.0895 
Intercept 0.4669 0.3549 0.3256 0.2012 0.1413 0.4080 
       
Lambda -0.0253 0.0987 0.4631* 0.1076 -0.4884* 0.1460 
       
       
 Chi2 Prob> Chi2 Chi2 Prob> Chi2   
Wald test (intercept only)  3001.60 0.00 3232.19 0.00   
       
       
 F Prob> F     
Chow test (constant coeff. 
between (1) and (2)) 
8.29 0.00     
       
N 3119  3494    
       
Source : OHS 1999. 
Notes : * statistically significant at the 1% level, **  the 5% level and ***  the 10% level.  
Reference categories: (a) low-skilled occupation, (b) manufacturing, (c) Gauteng 
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Table 5A. The Determinants of Union Membership. 
 
     
Dependent variable : 
Union membership 
White workers Black workers 
     
     
 Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error 
     
Years of schooling -0.0803** 0.0398 0.0255* 0.0060 
Years of schooling *tertiary 
schooling 
0.0030 0.0097 -0.0004 0.0062 
Age 0.1050* 0.0315 0.0589* 0.0133 
Age square -0.0015* 0.0004 -0.0007* 0.0002 
Tenure  0.0578* 0.0108 0.0838* 0.0058 
Tenure square -0.0005** 0.0003 -0.0017* 0.0002 
Married -0.1215 0.1274 0.1260** 0.0432 
High skilled occupationa -0.5376* 0.1656 -0.0409 0.0746 
Skilled occupation -0.0532 0.1600 0.0792*** 0.0424 
Formal sector -0.0453 0.2884 1.0178* 0.0808 
Agricultureb -0.6158** 0.3029 -0.8712* 0.0736 
Mining 0.5466** 0.1834 1.0447* 0.0719 
Utility 0.4860 0.3703 0.0443 0.1468 
Construction -0.2303 0.3020 -0.5053* 0.0836 
Trade -0.3180** 0.1612 -0.3024* 0.0659 
Transport 0.3610** 0.1758 -0.0296 0.0811 
Finance -0.1497 0.1554 -0.2343** 0.0838 
Service 0.6444* 0.1447 0.3622* 0.0663 
Urban 0.1397 0.1930 0.0320 0.0475 
Western Capec 0.0917 0.1348 0.3201* 0.0832 
Eastern Cape 0.7815* 0.1675 0.2379** 0.0815 
Northern Cape 0.3790*** 0.2101 0.3910* 0.1151 
Free State 0.3965** 0.1582 0.1434** 0.0685 
Kwazulu Natal 0.2138 0.2119 0.0814 0.0666 
North West 0.1088 0.2265 0.2076** 0.0673 
Mpumalanga 0.3984** 0.1735 0.2511* 0.0659 
Northern province 0.1827 0.2211 0.2865* 0.0760 
Dependence ratio 0.0374 0.0624 0.0074 0.0162 
Other union members  1.1828* 0.1108 0.6719* 0.0557 
Unemployed in the household 0.1249 0.1586 -0.0057 0.0411 
Intercept -1.7685** 0.7934 -3.1453* 0.2754 
     
N 1114  6613  
% of obs. correctly predicted 76.93%  77.74%  
     
Source : OHS 1999. 
Notes : * statistically significant at the 1% level, **  the 5% level and ***  the 10% level.  
Reference categories: (a) low-skilled occupation, (b) manufacturing, (c) Gauteng 
 
